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According to Schellenberg, our perceptual experiences have the epistemic 
force they do because they are exercises of certain sorts of capacity, namely 
capacities to discriminate particulars – objects, property-instances and events 
– in a sensory mode. She calls her account the “capacity view.” 
In more detail, the view is the following. Because they are exercises 
of sensory discriminatory capacities, experiences have content properties. In 
the good case, when they are successful exercises of these capacities, the 
experience has singular content – content directly about the discriminated 
particulars in the environment. Experiences with singular content give the 
subject what Schellenberg calls factive evidence. One has factive evidence 
only in the good case – when one is genuinely discriminating the particulars 
one seems to be. However, factive evidence isn’t the only sort of evidence 
experiences provide. They also provide what Schellenberg calls phenomenal 
evidence. Phenomenal evidence comes from a related but distinct sort of 
content-property experiences have, again because they are exercises of 
discriminatory capacities. Phenomenal evidence comes from an experience 
having a content type. A content type is neither a token singular content nor 
a general content but a content “schema.” As I understand this, to say 
experiences have content types is to say that they are so structured as to be 
eligible for having token singular contents, even if they only have gappy 
contents because no particulars are discriminated. Phenomenal evidence is 
evidence for a corresponding general proposition, e.g., there is a white cup 
before me, whereas factive evidence is evidence for a singular proposition, 
e.g., o is a white cup.  
Schellenberg claims that the capacity view makes it possible to give 
principled defenses of a number of intuitively appealing verdicts about cases 
prominent in the literature in epistemology on internalism and externalism.  
Two in particular are noteworthy. First, intuitively in bad cases, e.g., realistic 
and unsuspected hallucination cases and the more extreme brain-in-a-vat 
case, it seems the subject is justified in believing the likes of there is a white 
cup before me. But it also seems, Schellenberg thinks, that in the good case 
of genuine perception, one is better justified in this same belief. The capacity 
view can accommodate and defend the correctness of these intuitions. In the 
bad case, one still has justification, from one’s phenomenal evidence, for 
one’s general perceptual beliefs. However, because in the good case one also 
has factive evidence, one has better justification for these beliefs. Second, 
Swampman is intuitively justified in his perceptual beliefs. Some epistemic 
externalists are forced to deny Swampman is justified. On the capacity view, 
Swampman is just as justified as ordinary perceivers are. He exercises the 
same capacities as they do.  Thus, he has both factive and phenomenal 
evidence.  
In this paper, I will raise three concerns about Schellenberg’s capacity 
view. The first is whether we might do better to leave capacities out of our 
epistemology and take content properties as the fundamental epistemically 
relevant features of experiences. I argue we would. The second is whether 
Schellenberg’s appeal to factive and phenomenal evidence accommodates 
the intuitive verdicts about the bad case that she claims it does. I argue it 
does not. The third is whether Schellenberg’s account of factive evidence is 
adequate to capture nuances concerning the justification for singular but 
nondemonstrative perceptual beliefs, such as the belief that’s NN, where NN 
is a proper name. I argue it is not.  
If I am right, these points suggest a mental-state-first account of 
perceptual justification, rather than a capacity-first account, and one which 
treats the good and bad cases alike in respect of justification and complicates 
the relation between perceptual content and what one is justified in 
believing.  
 
1. A place for capacities in perceptual epistemology?  
 
What reasons might we have for thinking exercising perceptual capacities 
could provide the subject with evidence?  
In general, the truth of (1) does not secure the truth of (2): 
 
1.  Capacity C is a capacity to X. 
2.  So, exercises of capacity C provide the subject who has the capacity 
evidence that one Xs, or at least evidence for the truth of some proposition P 
suitably related to X-ing.  
 
There are many capacities one might have without knowing it and without 
knowing one is exercising it. You might have a capacity to please your 
neighbor with piano playing. When you exercise it, you have no evidence 
that you are doing so, nor do you have evidence for suitably related 
propositions such as my neighbor enjoys my playing, my neighbor is pleased, 
etc. If an instance of (1) is to secure the truth of (2), this must be due to 
something about the particular X. Perhaps in the case of the capacities 
underlying perceptual experience, we can find a filling for ‘X’ on which the 
truth of (1) does secure the truth of (2) for appropriate corresponding P.  
There are two sorts of search-strategy one might use in seeking out the 
right X/P in the case of perception. The first is to seek out a mental state X 
with independent epistemic force and to explain the epistemic relevance of 
capacities to X as derivative from the epistemic force of X. Such an 
approach is capacities-second approach. The second strategy is to choose 
an X without independent epistemic force and to explain the epistemic 
relevance of exercises of this capacity as deriving from the fact that they are 
exercises of this capacity. This is a capacities-first approach. Schellenberg 
endorses the capacities-first approach. I think there are reasons to prefer the 
capacities-second approach. 
There are as many capacity-second views as there are theories of the 
epistemic force of experience that take their epistemic force to come from 
some source other than the capacities exercised in having the experience. I’ll 
focus on perhaps the two most natural theories. The factive states view takes 
X to be the factive perceptual state of seeing that P (in the case of vision).  
On this view, such states have autonomous epistemic force, and capacities to 
be in such states have epistemic relevance only because they are capacities 
to produce states with such epistemic force. The phenomenal states view 
takes X to be perceptual experience with certain content. On this view, such 
states have autonomous epistemic force and, again, capacities to enjoy them 
have epistemic relevance derivatively.
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Schellenberg would quick to point out that these views have trouble 
with cases from the epistemological literature on internalism and 
externalism. The phenomenal states view does not explain how one is 
epistemically better off in the good case – not merely in respect of 
knowledge but evidence and justification. On the phenomenal states view, 
the BIV, for instance, gains the same justification from his experience as you 
do. (I deny this is an advantage, but I’ll not challenge it here.) The factive 
states view does not explain how the BIV’s experiences have epistemic 
force. The BIV, after all, does not successfully exercise the capacity to see 
that P.  
We might revise these views to mitigate these problems. In the case of 
the factive states proposal, we might allow that unsuccessful exercises of 
capacities to see that P, too, can give one evidence, insofar as they make it 
seem to the subject that she sees that P. On this view, similar to ones of 
                                                        
1 These two views are simplified versions of those of McDowell (1994) and Pryor 
(2000). 
certain disjunctivists, the state of seeing that P is epistemically fundamental 
and the state of seeming to see that P has epistemic force insofar as the 
subject in it seems to be in the epistemically fundamental state. This is still a 
capacities-second view. What is epistemically fundamental are states of 
seeing that P. They have epistemic force by their nature, and not because 
they are exercises of capacities. States of seeming to see that P have 
epistemic force derivatively, but their epistemic force comes not from 
capacities but from the fact that they are states of seeming to be in a state 
which has epistemic force.  
The phenomenal states view that we have described treats the good 
and bad cases alike. But there are variations on this view that treat them 
differently. Consider this variation. In the good case, one has a phenomenal 
state with a singular content, a content directly about the perceived object; 
whereas in the bad case, one’s phenomenal state has a content type, a type 
that in the good case allows the experience to have singular content. We then 
say that phenomenal states with singular content have epistemic force with 
respect to their contents and that phenomenal states with the corresponding 
content type have epistemic force only with respect to a generalized version 
of that same content. Let’s call this revised phenomenal states view the two-
tiered phenomenal states view.  
Now, this view looks a lot like Schellenberg’s. However, it is a 
capacities-second view. On this view, it’s having phenomenal states with the 
relevant contents and content types that is doing the epistemic work. 
However you get a phenomenal state with either a singular content or the 
corresponding content type, it’s because you have the phenomenal state with 
that content or content type that you have the perceptual evidence you do. 
It’s consistent with the two-tiered phenomenal states view that your 
phenomenal states have the contents or content types they do because they 
are exercises of certain capacities. That is, capacities might enter into the 
metaphysical ground of our having these phenomenal states. Still, capacities 
are not themselves epistemic explainers; rather, they enable us to enjoy the 
phenomenal states that are the epistemic explainers.  
We have arrived at a capacities-second view nearly identical to 
Schellenberg’s. It delivers the very same verdicts on cases as Schellenberg’s 
does. Indeed, as far as I can see, the only difference between this two-tiered 
phenomenal states capacities-second view and Schellenberg’s capacity-first 
view is that the latter adds a layer of metaphysical grounding and asserts this 
metaphysical grounding to be epistemically explanatory as well. 
Schellenberg’s view, that is, adds that the phenomenal states have the 
contents they do because they are exercises of the relevant discriminatory 
capacities and it asserts that this is what gives these states their epistemic 
force.  
My question is why we need to take this extra step. Why does your 
experience as of a white cup justify you in believing of the cup that it is 
white? The first-stab answer is: because it is an experience having the 
singular content concerning that cup that it is white.
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 The question is why 
this first stab wouldn’t be the end of the epistemic story, as far as facts about 
the experience are concerned. Why would we need to add to the explanation 
metaphysically deeper facts about the experience?   
Compare an analogy from value theory. The fact that an event is an 
instance of suffering suffices to make it prima facie disvaluable.  Now, do 
we need to go deeper into the metaphysical nature of suffering to give a 
deeper value-theoretic grounding of the disvalue of the suffering? I don’t see 
why. Perhaps any suffering is an instance of suffering because it has some 
complex neurobiological property N. Still, even though the event of 
suffering is a case of suffering because it is an instance of N, what explains 
its disvalue is that it is a case of suffering, not that it is a case of N. 
Similarly, we could say that it’s simply because the experience has a certain 
content that it has a certain epistemic force. Yes, it might have that content 
in virtue of further facts, but what explains its epistemic force is its having 
that content, not the further facts.
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Moreover, if we do take the extra step, we face the question of how it 
is that the facts about the capacities exercised are epistemic explainers. I 
cannot find an answer to this question in Schellenberg’s paper. She is 
explicit that experiences have their epistemic force because they are 
exercises of discriminatory capacities, but I cannot find an argument for this 
view as against the capacities-second two-tiered phenomenal states view we 
have been considering.  
There are ways Schellenberg could give capacities an explanatory 
role. The two such answers I will discuss are both epistemically externalist. 
That is, they make the possession of evidence or justification dependent on 
                                                        
2 This may not be what Schellenberg takes the content of this experience to be. 
However Schellenberg understands that content, we could reformulate the answer 
accordingly.    
3 Generally, we would deny the following principle: if x having P1 metaphysically 
grounds x having P2 and x having P2 makes it the case that x has epistemic property 
Q, then x having P1 makes it the case that x has epistemic property Q.  Schellenberg 
herself denies the principle, since she allows that the fact that an experience is an 
exercise of a capacity might itself have a deeper metaphysical grounding but also 
claims that this deeper grounding is explanatorily relevant to epistemology.   
truth-related factors that can vary across subjects who are alike in respect of 
their mental states as traditionally conceived.
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The first is a reliabilist proposal.  Suppose it were true that having the 
capacity to discriminate particulars entailed that exercises of it were usually 
successful. We might then explain why exercises of the capacity to 
discriminate blue should give me this evidence:  generally, when I exercise 
the capacity, I succeed in discriminating blue, and therefore generally when I 
exercise the capacity, it is true that there is something blue before me; and if 
generally when Y obtains, X obtains, then Y is evidence of X; and therefore 
exercising the capacity is evidence of something blue being before me.  
There is not much to like about this account. Having the capacity to 
discriminate blue does not seem entail general success at doing so, for one 
thing. I might have the capacity to discriminate blue but in fact generally 
discriminate white with blue lights shining on it. And of course a BIV might 
have the capacity to discriminate blue physical objects without ever doing so 
because she never visually discriminates any physical object. The account 
also requires giving the intuitively unappealing verdict about the BIV case: 
the BIV’s experiences do not justify her in believing (or provide her 
evidence) that there is something blue before her. 
The second is broadly Burgean.
5
 At times in the paper, Schellenberg 
appeals to ideas with a Burgean flavor:  perceptual capacities have a 
function and they have the epistemic import they do in part because of that 
function.  They are also “systematically linked” to the good case. Here is the 
Burge-inspired account, in rough outlines. One has the capacity to 
discriminate blue, if one does, because of past causal interactions between 
one’s own and one’s ancestors’ mental states and instances of blue. (If I and 
my ancestors would have interacted with some other color in place of blue, I 
would not have had the capacity to discriminate blue but rather to 
discriminate that other color.) Now, why do my present exercises of this 
capacity give me evidence of something blue being before me? Because in 
conditions that are normal with respect to my capacity – i.e., in the 
conditions that obtained during the relevant past interactions with blue, the 
interactions that make it the case that my capacity is a capacity to 
discriminate blue – the relevant mental states were caused by instances of 
blue. Thus, my current exercises of the capacity to visually discriminate blue 
are evidence that something blue is before me because in the sorts of 
                                                        
4 On traditional conceptions of mental states, a lifelong brain in a vat (or 
Swampman) could have the same mental states that I in fact have. 
5 See Burge (2003). 
conditions which ground my having this capacity the relevant mental states 
were caused by something blue.  Unlike the previous proposal, it is not 
reliability that grounds epistemic force but reliability in conditions 
explanatory of one’s having the capacity.   
This Burge-inspired account is not as easily refuted as the simple 
reliabilist account. There are important questions, I think, about why it is 
that if I am in non-normal conditions I am entitled to believe there is 
something blue before me when I exercise my capacity to discriminate blue 
– why should the fact that such a belief would be reliably formed in normal 
conditions show that there is something epistemically favorable about it 
when formed in non-normal conditions?   
The main problem, though, is that this account, like the reliabilist one, 
restricts the verdicts one can give about cases. On this account, one has the 
capacity to discriminate blue only because of one’s own and one’s ancestors’ 
past causal interactions with blue.  However, Swampman had no past 
interactions with anything and lacks ancestors. Thus, if Schellenberg is to 
give the intuitive response to the Swampman case, the one she gives – that 
his experiences do give him evidence concerning his environment – she 
cannot accept this Burgean proposal.   
By contrast, the capacities-second account does not restrict one’s 
verdicts about cases in these ways. And this seems right.
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Let me summarize the main points of this section. We can fashion a 
capacities-second account that agrees with Schellenberg on all the cases and 
is just like Schellenberg’s with the exception that it does not attribute any 
epistemic significance to whatever it is that metaphysically grounds facts 
about experiences having the content properties they do. As far as I can see, 
this account, the two-tiered phenomenal states view, has all the advantages 
of Schellenberg claims for her capacities-first view. Moreover, 
Schellenberg’s own account seems incomplete without an account of how 
facts about capacities are epistemic explainers. The two most natural such 
accounts are epistemically externalist and therefore restrict in undesirable 
ways the verdicts she can give about the relevant cases. Schellenberg’s view 
thus seems to take on a burden that buys one no advantages but saddles one 
with several important disadvantages. 
                                                        
6 This is not to deny that it might turn out that some externalist account of 
experiential content is correct, in which case the lifelong BIV might well not have 
experiences with contents as of blue, with the result that the intuitive verdict that 
the BIV is justified in believing something blue before him would be false. However, 
epistemology alone shouldn’t decide this. Only epistemology together with 
metaphysical theories of content does so.  
 2. Good and bad cases. 
 
As we’ve noted, one of the advantages Schellenberg claims for her account 
is that it respects both internalist and externalist intuitions about cases. One 
externalist intuition is that Percy (who perceives a white cup) is in an 
evidentially better position than Hallie (who hallucinates a white cup). 
Schellenberg claims her account can accommodate this purported evidential 
superiority.  
Schellenberg’s explanation is as follows. Phenomenal evidence, the 
evidence guaranteed by the fact that one is exercising a perceptual capacity, 
whether successfully or not, only supports general beliefs, whereas factive 
evidence, the evidence one has over and above phenomenal evidence when 
one successfully exercises the same capacities, supports singular beliefs as 
well. Thus, more of Percy’s beliefs are justified – his singular beliefs are 
justified while Hallie’s aren’t. But Percy’s general belief, too, is better 
justified, because Percy has more evidence for it – he has the evidence from 
his singular belief whereas Hallie doesn’t. 7 
In my view, this treatment of Percy and Hallie underestimates the 
epistemological credentials of Hallie’s beliefs, both her singular and her 
general beliefs. Schellenberg acknowledges that Hallie does indeed have a 
singular belief, even if the content of that belief is gappy. Hallie expresses a 
belief when she declares, “that is a white cup.” Now, is that belief justified? 
I think it is very hard to answer no. The same intuitions that push us toward 
thinking Hallie is justified in the general belief push us toward thinking 
Hallie is justified in the singular belief as well. Yet for Schellenberg Hallie’s 
singular belief isn’t justified, because there is no evidence for it, no factive 
and no phenomenal evidence.
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 Perhaps Schellenberg will simply take this in 
stride:  “fine, no justification for Hallie’s singular beliefs.” But there is a 
second problem in the offing. 
Hallie’s general belief seems to depend for its justification on her 
singular belief being justified. If Hallie were to ask herself why she thinks 
there is a white cup before him, she would answer, “because that thing is a 
                                                        
7 Here Schellenberg relies on the assumption that “having more evidence for 
p means that p is better justified” (p. 7). 
8 As Susanna Siegel pointed out to me, a question arises here for Schellenberg: why 
couldn’t enjoying an experience with a certain content type make Hallie justified in 
her singular belief? Perhaps she doesn’t have factive evidence, but could her 
phenomenal evidence justify her singular belief?  
white cup.” Her general belief seems based on her singular belief. If we rely 
on the standard proper-basing requirement on doxastic justification, then we 
must conclude that Hallie’s general belief is justified only if and because her 
singular belief is. If Schellenberg has to declare the singular belief 
unjustified, she seems forced to declare Hallie’s general belief unjustified as 
well. Perhaps Hallie has propositional justification for her general belief, but 
the belief itself, because based on an unjustified belief, is doxastically 
unjustified. This is an unfortunate result.
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3. Singular perceptual content and the nuances of justification 
 
Schellenberg writes that factive evidence is “individuated by the token 
content that ensues from employing these capacities successfully in a 
particular environment.” Because the experiences constituted by successful 
employment of these capacities have singular token content, factive 
evidence, too, is singular. So far, so good. But what follows about 
justification? 
About the case of identical twins, Schellenberg writes: 
 
“The token content of the perceiver’s mental state will differ, 
depending on what particular she is perceptually related to. On the 
capacity view, the token content counterfactually varies with the 
world. So what factive evidence one has is counterfactually sensitive 
to the world to which one is perceptually related. In W1 with object α, 
we have content C1. If the world changes to W2 with object β, we 
have distinct content C2, however close W1 and W2 are. What 
evidence one has determines what one has justification to believe. So I 
am arguing that even though we cannot tell whether we are seeing 
[twin] α and not [twin] β, we have (unbeknownst to us) evidence for 
the presence of α when seeing α and so prima facie justification for 
the proposition that α is present.”   
 
The justification is prima facie only, and so we needn’t worry that her 
account will give the incorrect verdict that even if I know I can’t tell the 
twins apart then if I see α I know I it is α.   
 Still, the underlying principle here seems overly strong.  The principle 
                                                        
9 The same considerations apply to the capacities-second two-tiered phenomenal 
states view outlined in the previous section, for it, too, denies that Hallie has 
evidence for her singular perceptual belief. 
is this: 
 
If the object α enters into the token content of one’s experience, then 
one is prima facie justified in believing that α is present. 
 
Suppose I happen to see a man on the street. He happens to be Bob Edwards, 
the former NPR host. Am I prima facie justified in believing it is Bob 
Edwards? No, and not because I have a special defeater. I have no idea what 
Bob Edwards looks like. Looking at him, there is no prima facie support 
from my experience for Bob Edward is present that is overridden or 
defeated.  This is not to say that I lack justification for believing other 
propositions about the person I see. I am justified in believing that this man 
is present or this man is tall, etc. when I see Bob Edwards.   
 Something similar applies to properties. The principle: 
 
If the property F-ness enters into the token content of my experience, 
then I am prima facie justified in believing F is present. 
 
Someone without perfect pitch may hear what is in fact a middle C. The 
property of being a C pitch enters the token content of the person’s 
experience. Still, the person has no prima facie justification to believe a C 
pitch is present. The person doesn’t know a C from a D from an A. There is 
no prima facie evidence that is somehow defeated or overridden. Again, 
there is justification to believe other propositions:  this pitch is present or 
this pitch is neither high nor low.  
 If factive evidence is individuated by token experiential content, then 
the link between factive evidence and prima facie justification must be more 
complex than Schellenberg seems to allow.
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